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DISSOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
& 
DISSOLUTION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT ASSE問BLY
By TATSUGORO 1SOZAKI 
Professor of Law， Osaka University 
1. 1ntroduction 
The Constitution of J apan provides the dissolution of the House of 
Representatives， and the Law of Local Self-government， 1947 provides 
the dissolution of local assemblies. 
Though both are dissolutions of assemblies， they make some di百er-
ence because the one is the dissolution of the House of Representatives， 
a House of Diet， and the other is the dissolution of assemblies of local 
public entities namely prefectural assemblies or city， town and village 
assemblies. 
Here， 1 intend to make clear the difference between them through 
considering regulations concerning both sides. 
2. Meaning of Dissolution. 
When we call dissolution of the House of Representatives or disso-
lution of local self-governmeht assemblies， the word “dissolution" is 
generally used in some fixed meaning. 
1t means that the existing House of Representatives or local self-
government assemblies lose their existence before the ful1 term of 0節目
of members is up when they are doubtful of standing for people's or 
innabitants' concerned wil1. 
The term of 0伍ceof al1 members is terminated before the ful1 term 
is up in case they are dissolved. 
At this point the House of Repre$entatives and local self-government 
assemblies are identical. 
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3. Person who can order or demand the dissolution. 
We may consider that the House of Representatives and local self-
government assemblies wi1 be dissolved by their own decision， however， 
the laws actuallyゃinforce do not provide it. Hence they are dissolved 
only by an order or a demand of someone else. Then who has the right 
of dissolution? 
1) In the case of the House ofRepresentatives. 
He who has the right of order Ilto dissolve the House of Representa-
tives is the Emperor， and none can do it except him. This is c1ear1y 
prescribed in Artic1e 7， Paragraph 3 of the Constitution of Japan. How-
ever， he can perform this act with the advice and approval of the Cabinet 
and can not do it without them in accordance with Artic1e 3 and Artic1e 
7 of the Constitution. If we take up only the prescription that the 
Emperor shall dissolve the House of Representatives with the advice 
and approval of the Cabinet， itwould seem that this prescription and 
the prescription that the Emperor shall dissolve the House of Representa幽
tives with the. advice of respective Ministers of State (Artic1e 7， Article 
55 of the Constitution of the Empireof Japan) in the age of Constitu司
tion of the Empire of Japan make litt1e di荘erence. But， infact， itmakes 
a great di宜erence.
In the age of former Constitution， as the Emperor shall combine in 
himself the rights of sovereignty as a sovereign only the Imperial Diet 
could consent the Emperor's law砂makingpower， as well as the judicial 
court execute its judicial power in the Emperor's name， and law-making 
power is originally vested in the Emperor， especially some五xedkinds 
of administration shall be executed without the consent of the Imperial 
Diet as matters concerning the Royal prerogative. It was prescribed as 
one of matters concerning the Royal prerogative that the Emperor shall 
order to dissolve the House of Representatives， therefore， itwas not the 
simple expression of a decision which was due to anyone's will， but the 
decision entirely based upon the Emperor's wi1. Though the Emperor 
had to be ad vised by乱1inisterof State， the Minister of State should 
advise the Emperor's act in the inside processes of its completion. 
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Minister of State， therefore， was neither to decide the external wi1l of 
state nor to restrain the Emperor with an advice which Minister of 
State offered to him in the internal relation. 
On the other side， in the Constitution of ]apan， itis di百erentfrom 
the above， that is， the sovereignty is vested in the people and the Diet 
which representq the people， the sovereign， isthe highest organ of state 
power. Besides the Diet is the sole law四makingorgan of the State and 
is not an organ which consents the Emperor's law-making power. The 
judicial court is not an organ which executes its judicial power in the 
Emperor's name， but has its own judicial power. The e玄ecutivepower 
also is not vested in the Emperor but in the Cabinet. Now the Emperor 
is not any sovereign， in other words， combines in himself no rights of 
sovereignty， and came to have the essentialfunction that he is the 
symbol of the State and of the unity of the people. And the Constitu-
tion also provides such a prescription that the Emperor shall perform 
some kinds of acts in matters of state. lIi this case， al acts of the 
Emperor in matters of state as well as the manner of the Emperor to 
perform them must be suitable to his position of the symbol of the 
State. About this， the Constitution of ]apan prescribes in Article 4 
that the Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as 
are provided in this Constitution and he shall not have power related 
to government. Therefore， (1) The Emperorshall perform no other 
acts in matters of state except those which are prescribed in the Con司
stitution. (Article 6， Article 7 of the Constitution of ]apan) At this point 
the Emperor di百ersfrom the same in the age of the Constitution of the 
Empire of ]apan， in which he had the whole power to perform acts 
in matters of state unless the Constitution restricted him oIi purpose. 
(2) The Emperor must not exercise powers related to government as 
if he had such powers in performing acts in matters of state. Powers 
related to government are vested in others but the Emperor， and he is 
to perform what they decide， as the acts in matters of state themselves. 
At this point the Emperor differs from the same in the age of the Con-
stitution of the Empire of ]apan， in which he had the whole power to 
perform acts in matters of state with his own decision while he exercised 
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his powers related to government being founded on the Constitution. 
Thus， today the Emperor dissolves the House of Representatives not 
in the capacity of the person that has powers related to government 
but as a person who merely performs the fixed acts in matters of state. 
Easily speaking， he who actually decides the dissolution of the House 
of Representatives is not the Emperor， and the Emperor only expresses 
the decision itself to be done by others as acts in matters of state. 
And then who actually decides them?‘The Cabinet is that. All acts 
of the Emperor in matters of state require the advice and approval of 
the Cabinet. (Article 3， Article 7 of the Constitution) Now the Cabinet 
is essencially the highest general executive organ of the State to be dif-
ferent from the Minister of State in old ages that was a simple organ 
of advice. In this way the Cabinet which generally has executive power 
is qualified for a function to advise and approve the Emperor at the 
same time. And then it is to say that such advice and approval of the 
Cabinet， against the advice .of Minister of State， restrain the Emperor's 
will. Because if the Emperor performs his acts in matters of state in 
contract to the advice and approval of the Cabinet he would come to 
have powers related to government in this sphere to the violation of 
the Constitution. Then the Emperor performs the act to dissolve the 
House of Representatives as it is， with the advice and approval to dis-
solve it. The Cabinet which advises and approves the Emperor decides 
actually the dissolution of the House of Representatives， while the 
Emperor performs the act in matters of state formally to dissolve it 
founded on the above decision. The person who dissolves the House of 
Representatives in the Constitution of Japan is the Emperor， but it is 
memorable that this makes a large di妊erencefl'Om the dissolution of 
the House of Representatives by him in the Constitution of the Empire 
of Japan. 
2) In the case of local self-government assemblies. 
Persons who order to dissolve local self-government assemblies are 
the chief executive 0伍cersof local pub1ic entities concerned. Beside 
this， ithappens that assemblies are dissolved by direct popular demand 
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within their communities. 
a) The chief executive 0缶cers'order of dissolution. 
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In accordance with Article 178， Paragraph 1 of the Law of Local 
Self -government，“If the assembly of general local public entity passes 
a non-confidence resolution in the chief executive 0自cerof local public 
entity concerned， the chairman has to report it to the chief executive 
officer of local public entity concerned. In this case， the chief executive 
o伍cerof general local public entity may dissolve the assembly within 
10 days since he received the report." So it is no doubt that the chief 
executive 0自cerscan dissolve the assemblies of local self-government. 
It is a question whether the chief executive officers are able to dissolve 
assemblies not only in the case above mentioned but also in other cases. 
And 1 wi1 consider in the following section about this， but for the 
present to describe only my conclusion， the chief executive 0自cersare 
able to dissolve assemblies in the sole caseabove mentioned and have 
no r~ght generally to dissolve them. 
Now was it admitted in the old system of local self-government to 
dissolve assemblies by the chief executive 0缶cers? The answer is“No." 
I will leave prefectures for the present because they were half-self-
governing bodies (imperfect autonomies) in old ages. Concerning city， 
town and village which were perfect autonomies， the sphere of self-
governing works was more limitted， self-governing powers were restricted 
by far and the right of State to superintend was extremely large and 
strong in comparison with the same in present time. The chief executive 
o伍cersof each city， town and vi1age were elected by assemblies of 
each city， town and village to be different from the present time， and 
not the chief executive 0茄cersof city， town and village but the Minister 
for Home A旺airsthat was the central government 0珪ceof State could 
order to dissolve city， town and village assemb1ies. (Article 162 of the 
Law of City of 1910， Article 142 of the Law of Town and Village of 
1911) That is， dissolutions of city， town and village assemblies were 
.not the matters of internal relation of city， town and vi1age concerned 
but were performed as one of operations of State to superintend each 
city， town and village. On the other hand， after the war the Constitution 
6 TATSUGORO ISOZAK1 
of ]apan was enforced and the former system of local self-government 
came to be fundamentally reformed one after the other， and then pre-
fectures became generallocal public entities which are perfect autonomies 
as well as city， town and village， the sphere of self-governing works of 
these local self-government entities was enlarged， self-governing powers 
were strengthened and the superintendence of State was much restrained. 
Thus the case disappeared that the Minister of State for Home Affairs 
could dissolve the local self-government assemblies， and the chief execu-
tive 0缶cersof local self-government entities concerned came to be able to 
dissolve local self-government assemblies concerned. Besides such chief 
executive 0伍cersare elected， not by local self-government assemblies 
but direct popular vote within their communities. And when the chief 
executive 0自cersdissolve local self-government assemblies they are able 
to perform the act with their own decision. This is different from the 
case that if the Emperor .dissolves the House of Representatives the 
dissolution is only a formal act of the Emperor with the actual decision 
of the Cabinet. 
b) The direct popular demand for dissolution. 
It happens that dissolution of local self-government assembly bases 
upon the direct popular demand within its community， in addition to 
the dissolution by the chief executive 0伍cer. Namely in accordance 
with prescriptions of the Ordinance for the Enforcement of Law of Local 
Self-government， those who are inhabitants of the community concerned 
and have right to vote at the same time are able to demand to dissolve 
the assembly towards the election-committee， with the joint signature 
， of one-third or more of the whole number from deligate of signatories. 
When the demand is required， the election-committee must make it 
public at once， while leave it to be voted by electors.' When the result 
of vote comes clear， the election-committee must report it to the deHgate 
above mentioned and the chairman of assembly， and make it public at 
once， while it must report， in prefecture， to the chief executive 0茄cer
and the Prime Minister， and in city， town and village， to the chief 
executive of五cerand the chief executive 0缶cerof prefecture concerned. 
The assembly shall be dissolved with a伍rmativevote of a majority of 
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al votes in the voting for dissolution. (Article 13， Paragraph 1 and 
Article 76-78 of the Law of Local.Self-government， Article 100-109 
of the Ordinance for the Enforcement of Law of Local Self-government) 
Concerning the direct popular demand， the inhabitant must have right 
to vote， and not the inhabitant who has right to vote may demand 
individually， but with joint signature of one-third or more of al number. 
It is a kind of joint acts， so to say. It is only allowed that the inhab-
itant can demund the dissolution of the assembly and that demand does 
not necessarily mean the dissolution itself. If the demand is required， 
the vote of dissolution is performed by the election-committee， the as-
sembly is dissolved only when the a缶rmativevote of a majority of al 
popular votes is gotten in the result of the vote， and if the a缶rmative
vote of a majority of al votes is not gotten the assembly can not be 
dissolved. Therefore， the direct popular demand can not cause the dis-
solution of assembly by itself， against the chief executive 0缶cercan 
dissolve the same by himself. But the very fact that the direct popular 
demand is allowed by law is important for the self-governing by the 
inhabitant. This institution newly comes to be allowed as one of direct 
popular demands， as well as the demand to enact， amend and abrogate 
their own regulations， inspect of a宜airsand dismiss the members of 
assembly， the chief executive 0伍cerand such other local 0田cials，and 
has never seen in the old institution of local self-government. And such 
an institution of the direct popular demand is now only allowed to the 
local inhabitant in the sphere of the local self-government， and not to 
the general people of the state in the sphere of the government. There-
fore such an institution is not allowed that the people directly demand 
the dissolution of the House of Representatives. 
4. The case in which the dissolution is performed. 
As the dissolution is performed in such a case that the existing 
House of Representatives or local self-government assembly comes to 
be doubtful to represent the wi1l of the people or the inhabitant con-
cerned， in the logical point of view， the dissolution is to be certainly 
performed in al such cases. Such cases may be various and generally 
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considering for examples， (1) when non働confidenceresolution is done for 
the Cabinet or the chief executive 0盟cer，(2) when the important bil 
presented by the Cabinet or the chief executive 0伍ceris rejected， (3) 
when the members of assembly who support the Cabinet or the chief 
executive 0缶cerare minority. 1t is the logical request that the assembly 
can be dissolved in al such cases. But in the actual institution it is 
not necessary to allow the dissolution in al these cases， but is possible 
to allow the dissolution in special cases limitted. How is this point 
prescribed on the law actually in force? 
1) 1n the case of the House of Representatives. 
“If the House of Representatives passes a non-confidence resolution， 
or rejects a con長denceresolution， the Cabinet shall resign en m?sse， 
unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days." 
This is the prescription in Article 69 of the Constitution. It is no 
doubt that the House of Representatives can be dissolved by this pre-
scription when the non-confidence resolution is done for the Cabinet. 
But it is the question whether the dissolution of the House of Repre-
sentatives is limitted only in this case or not. 
Some disputants assert that the House of Representatives can be 
dissolved only in the case prescribed in Article 69 of the Constitution， 
but the common opinion， against it， isas followed; the HOlise of Rep酌
resentatives can be dissolved not only in the case above mentioned 
but also in every case that the existing House、ofRepresentatives is 
doubtful to represent the people's will and at the same time it seems 
to be necessary to ascertain the people's will. 1 support this common 
opinion， too. Because on one hand the prescription in Article 69 of 
the Constitution is certainly a prescription related to the dissolution， 
but it does not mean to restrict the case in which the House of Repre-
sentatives is dissolved， for it originally prescribes one of the cases in 
which the Cabinet shall resign en masse， on the other hand， the Article 
7， Paragraph 3 of the Constitution prescribes only that the Emperor 
shall dissolve the House of Representatives， and does not prescribe at 
al when he shall do so， as above mentioned. Though 1 say so， 1 
won't assert that the House of Representatives can be dissolved wilfully 
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at any time， but the existing House of Representatives also can. be 
dissolved when it is doubtful to represent the people'swill， not always 
a non-confidence resolution is done. 
2) In the case of the local self-government assemblies. 
The local self-government assembly is dissolved by the chief ex-
ecutive 0缶ceror the direct popular demand as shown the above. 
wi1 consider about it separately. 
a) In the case to be dissolved by the chief executive 0田cer.
So I 
The Law of Local Self-government prescribes in Article 178 that 
the chief executive 0缶cercan dissolve the assembly when the local self-
government assembly passes a non-confidence resolution for him. And 
when the assembly passes the resolution to strike out or reduce the 
expenditure necess~ry for emergency or restoration establishment caused 
by disaster， for prevention against infectious disease， the chief executive 
o自cermust lay the matter before the assembly again with its reason. 
And then， when the matter is reconsidered and the assembly resolves 
again to strike out or reduce the expenditure， the chief executive 0缶cer
can regard that resolution as a non-confidence resolution. (Article 177， 
Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 4 of the Law of Local Self-government) 
Therefore， the chief executive officer can dissolve the local self-govem司
ment assembly likewise in this case. Then whether the dissolution of 
local self輔governmentassembly is limitted in the case in which thεnon-
confidence resolution is passed (contained the case regarded as when a 
non-confidence resolution is passed. The same， below)， or the assembly 
generally can be dissolved if the existing local self-government assembly 
falls under the case in which it theoretically might be dissolved. The 
answer is that the dissolution is limitted in the case in which the non飾
confidence resolution is passed， because concerning the case in which 
the executive 0自cercan dissolve the local self-government assembly， 
the Law of Local Self-government prescribes nothing but in Article 178. 
b) In the case of thedirect popular demand for the dissolutioll. 
Concerning the direct popular demand for the dissolution oI the 
local self-government assembly， the Law of Local Self-government only 
prescribes that the demand shall be allowed， and does not special1y con-
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strain when it can be done. So the inhabitants can demand whenever 
they recognize as a matter of course they should require the dissolution 
of the assembly. But the assembly is not always dissolved by the direct 
popular demand， but is dissolved with the a盟rmativevote of a. majority 
of a1 popular votes at the voting for dissolution as above mentioned. 
5. The time of dissolution. 
Is any restriction set up about the time to perform the dissolution? 
About this， here is a question at first whether the dissolution must be 
constricted while the assembly is in session or not. But the House of 
Representatives or the local self-government assembly can be dissolved 
while it is not in session if needed， because the dissolution denies the 
existence of the House of Representatives or the local self-government 
assembly and they exist even while they are not in session. But in 
fact， the dissolution while they are in session is more frequently， and 
the House of Representatives and the local self -government assembly 
make no di妊erencein this point. 
Next， issuch any restriction set up that the assembly must not be 
dissolved in a certain period from a datum time? Such restriction is 
not set up in the case of the dissolution of the House of Representa-
tives at a1. 1n the case of the local self-government assembly， such 
restriction is not also set up in the dissolution by the chief executive 
o匝cerbut in the dissolution by the direct popular demand. Namely， 
the direct popular demand for dissolution must not be performed for a 
year from the date of the ordinary election of the members of the as-
sembly， as we11 as the date of the voting for dissolution of the assembly. 
(Article 79 of the Law of Local Self-government) 
6. The measure after dissolution. 
The dissolution has the function to deny the existence of the House 
of Representatives or the local self-government assembly， however， itis 
not the essencial function simply to deny the existence of them but 
to ascertain the true wi1l of the people or the inhabitant within the 
community. Therefore， they can not leave the assembly dissolved but 
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must take a certain measure of it. Then what prescription is provided 
about this? 
1) In the case of the House of Representatives. 
When the House of Representatives is dissolved there must be a 
general election of members of the House of Representatives within 
forty days from the date of dissolution， and the Diet must. be convoked 
within thirty days from the date of the election. (Article 54， Paragraph 
1 of the Constitution. Article 31 of the Law of Public Officials Election， 
1950. Article 1 of the Law of Diet， 1947.) The Diet convoked after 
dissolution is named the special session， tobe different from the ordinary 
orextraordinary session of the Diet. (Article 1， Paragraph 3 of the 
Law of Diet.) 
When the House of Representatives is dissolved， the House of Coun-
ci10rs is closed at the same time. However， the Cabinet may in time 
of national emergency convoke the House of Councillors in emergency 
session. (Article 54， Paragraph 2 of the Constitution. Article 4 of the 
Law of Diet.) When the House of Representatives is dissolved and the 
House of Councillors is closed， the Diet is to cease its activity. Then in 
this time， how to deal with the matters that originally require the resolu-
tion of the Diet and must be emergent1y disposed? The Constitution of 
the Empire of J apan provided the prescriptions concerning the emergency 
ordinances and financial measures for this case， (Article 8， Article 
70 of the Constitution of the Empire of J apan) and the Emperor could 
deal such matters by himself without ascertaining the opinion of the 
House of Peers. Di百erentlyfrom this， the Constitutiou of Japan pre-
scribes that the Cabinet may convoke the House of Councillors in emer-
gency session. This di妊erencecomes from the fact that in former times 
the Emperor was the sovereign and the Imperial Diet was only an 
assistant organ for him， especially the House of Peers did not consist 
of members elected by the people， while today the sovereign is the 
people， the Diet which represents the people is the highest organ of 
state power and the House of Councillors， the second House， consists 
of members e1ected by the people like the other House. Concerning 
the activity of the House of Councillors convoked in emergency session， 
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there is the Rule of the House of Counci1lors in Emergency Session， 
1947. The measures taken by the House of Counci1lors at the emergency 
session have in its sphere the same effect as the measures taken by the 
Diet but are provisional and shall become null and void unless agreed 
to by the House of Representatives within a period of ten days after 
the opening of next session of the Diet. (Article 54， Paragraph 3 of 
the Constitution) It is not prescribed that when the豆ouseof Repre-
sentatives is dissolved， the Cabinet must resign en masse at once. 
But the Cabinet must resign en masse upon the convocation of the 
special session after a general election after dissolution， because there 
is a prescription that the Cabinet generally shall resign en masse upon 
the first convocation of the Diet after a general election of members 
of the House of Representatives. (Article 70 of the Constitution) This 
is not related to majority or minority of members that support the 
Cabinet after the general election. Even if the members that support 
the Cabinet are majority， there must be resignation en masse. When 
the Cabinet resigns en masse， itis required newly to make the Cabinet. 
For this purpose， the Prime Minister newly shall be designated by the 
Diet. (Article 67 of the Constitution) In this designation it happens 
that the person who was the Prime Minister of the Cabinet resigned en 
masse is designated again， or another person is newly designated. The 
person who designated by the Diet is appointed by the Emperor as the 
Prime Minister， (Article 6， Paragraph 1 of the Constitution) the Prime 
Minister appoints other Ministers of State， (Article 68， Paragraph 1 of the 
Constitution) and thus the new Cabinet comes into existence. The 
function of the Cabinet from the time when the Cabinet resigns en masse 
to the time when the Prime Minister is newly appointed is continued by 
the same Cabinet resigned en masse. (Article 71 of the Constitution) 
2) In the case of the localself-government assembly. 
When the local self-government assembly is dissolved， there must 
be an ordinary election within forty days from the date of dissolution. 
(Article 33， Paragraph 2 of the Law of Public 0伍cialsElection) Specially 
concerning the session五rstconvoked after the ordinary election based 
upon the dissolution， there is not such any prescription that the session 
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shall be convoked within some days from the date of election， therefore， 
this session is convoked in accordance with the convocation of the 
ordinary or extraordinary session. (Article 101， Article 102 of the Law 
of Local Self幽government)
When the matters required the resolution of the assembly must be 
taken measures emergently after the dissolution of the local self-govern司
ment assembly， the chief executive 0伍cercan deal with the ma tters by 
himself. The chief executive officer must report about this disposition 
to the assembly at the next session and ask for approval. (Article 179 
of the Law of Local Self-government) In the local self-government 
assembly that is the unicameral legislature， such a system is not con-
siderable as the convocation of the House of Councillors in emergency 
sesslOn. 
Besides， the chief executive 0缶cermay not resign upon the first 
convocation of the local self-government assembly after an ordinary elec-
tion after dissolution， because there is not such prescription that the 
Cabinet shall resign en masse upon the first convocation of the Diet 
after a general election of members of the House of Representatives. 
Therefore， there is no trouble if the members that support the chief 
executive 0伍ceris majority after that ordinary election， but when the 
members that oppose to the chief executive 0伍cercome to make major-
ity a non-confidence resolution would be passed again at the first 
session convoked after that ordinary election. It is rather worse to 
acknowledge that the chief executive 0伍cercontinues his 0血ce，in spite 
of a non-confidence resolution passed again at this session as above 
mentioned， therefore， the Law of Local Self-government provides the 
prescription that the chief executive 0節目rmust retire from his 0缶ce.
When the assembly is dissolved by the chief executive of五cersince a 
non-con五denceresolution， a non-confidence resolution is passed again at 
the first session convoked after that dissolution， and the chief executive 
o伍ceris reported this fact by the chairman of the assembly， the chief 
executive 0盟cershall retire his office at the date of his receipt of the 
report from the chairman. (Article 178， Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 3 
of the Law of Local Self-government) When the chief executive officer 
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retires his 0伍ce，there must be the election of the new chief executive 
officer. Then this election is called by-election to be different from the 
election at the expiration of term of 0茄ce，and must be performed 
within fifty days from the date when the reason to perform this 
election occurs. (Article 34， Paragraph 1 of the Law of Public 0伍cials
Election) During the vacancy from the chief executive 0伍cerretires 
his 0缶ceuntil the new chief executive officer is elected， the function 
of the chief executive 0伍ceris continued by the assistant governor in 
prefecture， by the deputy-mayor or headman's assistant in city， town 
and village. (Article 152 of the Law of Local Self-government) 
